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Introduction  
For many decades, Washington has been concerned about the possibility of a Japanese nuclear 
option. The NPT was formed in part to keep Japan from going nuclear. Henry Kissinger predicted 
the United States would not be able to prevent Japan from acquiring its own nuclear weapons. 
After the North Korean nuclear test of October 2006, concern was expressed globally about a 
potential Japanese nuclear response. For decades, however, Japan has instead exercised 
nuclear forbearance, preferring to rely on U.S. extended deterrence and global disarmament 
diplomacy. For how much longer can we expect this policy pattern to continue? To analyze this 
question, this article examines the factors most likely to keep Japan on its current non-nuclear 
path, as well as those with the potential of spurring Japan to take the nuclear option. To begin, 
however, the paper provides insight into past Japanese nuclear decision-making by exploring the 
four time periods in which the country seriously considered its own military nuclear capability. 
Japan Nuclear Decision-Making  
Japanese elite seriously considered a military nuclear capability four times since the end of World 
War II: in the mid-1960s (due to the 1964 Chinese nuclear test), the mid-1970s (when Japan 
debated whether to ratify the NPT), the mid-1990s (when Japan debated the question of NPT’s 
indefinite extension), and the current time frame (due to the North Korean nuclear crisis). 
Mid-1960s  
After the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, the Japanese government ordered a secret study to assess 
the costs and benefits of a Japanese nuclear weapons program.[1] Two reports were issued: a 
technical and economic feasibility study, in 1968, and a political analysis, in 1970. The reports 
concluded that “technically, there were no impediments but politically it would not be wise.”[2] Of 
particular interest is the second report, which weighed the political and strategic costs and 
benefits of an independent nuclear option, and which concluded that it was not the best path for 
Japan. In terms of benefits, an indigenous nuclear program would allow Japan to forgo 
dependence on the United States, which had defeated Japan militarily (through the use of atomic 
weapons, no less) less than two decades before. Japan would not have to rely on U.S. extended 
deterrence, the credibility of which was questioned by some Japanese elites. The country could 
also avoid makikomare ron, entanglement in American conflicts. In addition, Japan would regain 
national pride by joining the nuclear “club.” In terms of costs, a nuclear weapons program would 
strain the relationship with the United States, divert resources from economic growth, and lead to 
deterioration of the security environment in the region, as well as likely diplomatic isolation. “The 
authors felt, in conclusion, that Japan’s security would best be attained through a multi-
dimensional approach including political and economic efforts, and not through a traditional 
militaristic, power-based approach.”[3] Finally, the ruling party (the Liberal Democratic Party) 
likely realized the steep political costs that a nuclear option would impose, given the strong anti-
nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public.[4] 
Mid-1970s 
In contrast to the nuclear soul-searching of the 1960s, which was brought on by fear of a nuclear 
aggressor (China), the nuclear debate of the 1970s was prompted by negotiations on the NPT. 
While the NPT was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, Japan did not 
sign it until 1970, and took until 1976 to ratify it. These delays created suspicions in the 
international community about Japan’s nuclear intentions. If Japan were committed to its three 
non-nuclear principles (Prime Minister’s Sato 1967 pledge that Japan “will not manufacture or 
possess nuclear weapons or allow their introduction into this country” [5]), it was argued, why 
would its leaders stall in embracing the international norm against nuclear nonproliferation? The 
answer lies in the difficulty Japanese politicians had in creating a consensus for ratification in a 
divided society. Eventually, reassurances on the non-negotiable nature of the three non-nuclear 
principles convinced the left to support NPT ratification; security guarantees and settlement of 
nuclear energy concerns convinced the right wing of the LDP. What convinced the centrist 
elements of the government, both the bureaucracy and the bulk of the LDP? For the most part, 
politicians and policy makers believed that refusing to ratify the NPT was unthinkable due to the 
rift it would cause with the United States. Japan’s defense was secured through the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty, and the United States was by far Japan’s closest ally. MOFA “repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of Japan’s ratification of the NPT as a means for further increasing 
the U.S.’s trust of Japan: as Japan’s ratification of the NPT touched upon the fundamental issue 
of the level of mutual trust between the U.S. and Japan, it was felt that any further hesitation in 
ratifying the NPT without a clear justification would damage the friendly U.S.-Japan bilateral 
relationship.”[6] Officially, the Japanese government issued a statement declaring that by joining 
the NPT, Japan would further reinforce its role as a “Peace Nation” and its support of “Peace 
Diplomacy,” and would increase international trust in Japan.[7] Once ratification took place, the 
nuclear issue was considered settled. More than one Japanese defense expert agreed that with 
the ratification of the NPT, Japan’s debate about nuclear weapons never approached the same 
intensity of pre-NPT, simply because the Japanese had made a commitment and they saw it as 
unlikely that they would break it. 
Mid-1990s 
Japan’s nuclear deliberations in the mid-1990s were spurred by two events: the North Korean 
attempted withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993, and the push for an indefinite extension of the 
NPT in 1995. In other words, Japan’s closest neighbor revealed it was working on a nuclear 
weapons program, and the international community was asking Japan to forswear nuclear 
weapons indefinitely. It should come as no surprise that Japan reassessed its nuclear status. The 
reluctance to support indefinite extension came from two main sources. First, both the left and 
center were concerned that indefinite extension would mean that Article 6 of the NPT, which 
called for the nuclear weapons states to work toward nuclear disarmament, would become 
obsolete.[8] Second, a small but influential minority in the right wing of the LDP opposed the 
indefinite extension because they wanted to preserve a nuclear option.[9] The issue was abruptly 
resolved in September 1993, when a newly elected government declared its support for making 
the NPT permanent.[10]  
The Japanese change of heart likely came about for a number of reasons. Negative domestic and 
international reaction to Japan’s opposition to indefinite extension was stronger and more 
pronounced than expected. U.S. pressure influenced the decision, especially given the lead role 
the United States was playing in diffusing the North Korea nuclear crisis. Finally, the North 
Korean crisis was being managed, with negotiations and diplomatic efforts involving the United 
States, South Korea, the IAEA, and the United Nations. However, while publicly the Japanese 
had settled the issue, internally questions lingered. Although not revealed until 1999, in 1995 the 
Japan Defense Agency conducted an interview review of a potential Japanese nuclear weapons 
program, benignly entitled “A Report Concerning the Problems of the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction.”[11] According to JDA sources, “the 31-page internal document was drawn up 
by three members of the Defense Agency internal bureaus, the Joint Staff Council and the 
National Institute for Defense Studies under the instruction of then vice minister of defense, 
Shigeru Hatakeyama.”[12] While the text of the report has not been released, it apparently 
contained a plan for a potential nuclear weapons program, for a JDA spokesman told reporters 
“the plan was scrapped due to fears it would violate the Nonproliferation Treaty, undermine the 
U.S. military presence in the region, and cause a backlash from Asian nations.”[13] Japanese 
efforts to develop nuclear weapons would signal a loss of trust in the United States, which would 
hurt the diplomatic and political relationship, as well as potentially undermine the credibility of U.S. 
security guarantees. With a majority of states agreeing by consensus to indefinitely extend the 
NPT at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, they feared a Japanese decision to violate the treaty 
would both weaken the nonproliferation regime and cause a severe backlash over Japanese 
hypocrisy. A senior Japanese expert in nuclear issues noted that JDA knew a nuclear weapons 
program “would deal a serious blow to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and that 
was a part of their reasoning to say no.”[14] 
Current Period 
Japan’s latest round of nuclear introspection began in October 2002, when the U.S. government 
accused Pyongyang of a secret uranium enrichment program. Considering tensions with North 
Korea were already high, due to the DPRK’s confirmation just a month earlier that they had 
abducted Japanese citizens, both the Japanese government and citizenry felt cheated and 
disillusioned. North Korea’s continued confrontational behavior—such as attempting to “ban” 
Japan from the talks to resolve the nuclear crisis and then declaring that Japan should be dealt 
with “with arms, not words”—only further hardened the populace against their neighbor.[15] The 
concern escalated after the North Korean nuclear test in October 2006. In response, fears of a 
Japanese nuclear response spiked—especially when high-level LDP officials openly called for 
discussion of an indigenous nuclear option.[16] While Prime Minister Shinzo Abe responded to 
these calls by declaring Japan’s commitment to the three non-nuclear principles, he refused to 
dismiss the officials and also argued that in a democracy, he could not quash debate on the 
matter.[17] In addition, the Japanese government conducted a secret study about the possibility 
of going nuclear; the report was leaked to the press in late December. Titled “On the Possibility of 
Developing Nuclear Weapons Domestically,” the report examined the technical feasibility of 
producing tactical nuclear weapons. Because of the multitude of technical problems, it was 
estimated it would take at least three years and between 20-30 billion yen to create a small 
stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons.[18]  
In the short term, however, Tokyo seems quite unlikely to respond to the North Korean 
provocations with a nuclear capability of its own. LDP officials, after all, were not calling for a 
Japanese nuclear weapons program—only to open discussion about the possibility. The public 
remains strongly anti-nuclear; a Yomiuri Shimbun poll conducted a month after the North Korea 
nuclear tests revealed that 80 percent of the populace supported upholding the three non-nuclear 
principles, while only 18 percent believed they should be revised.[19] Japanese defense and 
nuclear experts expressed surprise at the lack of serious discussion about a nuclear option; one 
noted, “It surprised me how calm the Japanese public was after the NK test. I heard few people 
saying Japan should go nuclear. The media were saying, ‘Japan should not go nuclear in 
response.’ Even the conservative papers did not argue Japan should go nuclear.”[20] Others 
noted that the country remained much more focused on abduction issues.[21]  
Nonetheless, the North Korea nuclear test has provoked a number of more subtle changes in 
Japanese attitudes. First, the public is much more accepting of discussion of a nuclear option, 
and government officials are more willing to engage in such discussion. Previously, any 
discussion of a military nuclear capability was taboo; officials who raised the issue either were 
dismissed or had to retract their statements. While opposition leaders demanded the same after 
the LDP officials raised the possibility of a nuclear Japan, public response was minimal and the 
officials were not dismissed. The difference in public reaction was noted by the opposition: 
“Ozawa pointed out that former DPJ lawmaker Shingo Nishimura resigned as a parliamentary 
vice minister in 1999 after saying in a magazine interview that Japan should debate whether to 
possess nuclear weapons. ‘Even the parliamentary vice minister resigned,’ Ozawa said. ‘That is 
how serious (this issue) is.’”[22] Defense officials argued privately that discussion of a nuclear 
option should be allowed to show that it is not a good choice for Japan. “As long as we adhere to 
the three non-nuclear principles, why can’t we talk about it?”[23] The second change prompted by 
the North Korean nuclear tests is the number of analysts arguing that Japan should consider 
hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, to enhance the credibility of U.S. extended 
deterrence.[24] This would require revision of the third non-nuclear principle—allowing the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan—but experts argued this would be preferable and 
more practical than Japan developing its own nuclear capability. Such a change is extremely 
unlikely, but the fact that people are talking about it is notable. These two changes do mark an 
openness to military nuclear capacity, but the fact that North Korea’s nuclear tests produced only 
these changes—and not a Japanese commitment to its own nuclear deterrent—shows that Japan 
is not likely to develop nuclear weapons any time soon. 
Determinants of Japanese Nuclear Policy  
If Japan is unlikely to develop nuclear weapons in the short term, what about in the long term? An 
over-the-horizon view can help us pinpoint the factors most likely to instigate changes in 
Japanese nuclear weapons policy. Because of the strength of most domestic factors in keeping 
Japan non-nuclear, international factors will be the most likely cause should Japan decide to 
reverse its decades-long policy of nuclear forbearance. 
Domestic Determinants  
Most domestic inputs act to keep Japan non-nuclear (although not all). Thus, reversal in some of 
these inputs could influence a reconsideration of the nuclear option.  
Nuclear Allergy. The Japanese “nuclear allergy”—the widely used term to describe the 
Japanese aversion to nuclear weapons—is weakening but still has the potential to be a powerful 
political force. The allergy is strongest among older populations, who have more of a connection 
with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, even after the North Korean nuclear test, few Japanese 
wanted to see the country acquire its own nuclear option. This is in part due to what one 
Japanese defense expert called “reproduced memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” Cartoons, 
comic books, movies, radio programs, and television shows have exposed generations of 
Japanese to the atomic devastation Japan experienced.[25] Peace education is a mandatory 
component in schools, and even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spends money on anti-nuclear 
education programs.[26] As a result, the Japanese dread of nuclear weapons is deep-seated and 
long lasting. One prominent defense official, who received training in the United States and other 
Western countries, noted, “As a graduate student in the U.S., I felt very uneasy when I tried to 
discuss topics like nuclear strategy objectively, leaving those moral judgments aside. I somehow 
do not like nuclear weapons. More instinctively, I hate them.”[27]  
The political potency of the nuclear allergy comes into play because due to it, politicians are 
extremely reluctant to raise the possibility of a Japanese nuclear option. Defense experts agree 
that nuclear weapons are the political “third rail” in Japanese politics, a topic to be handled 
carefully and best avoided if at all possible. A former ambassador noted, “No politician dares to 
take this up! Anti-nuclear sentiment is SO strong. Some may think it in their heart but would never 
express it.”[28] Even those who believe the nuclear allergy has weakened significantly still admit 
that the threat of negative public response keeps politicians from raising the nuclear issue. 
“Pacifist public opinion is not organized, just very vague, just atmosphere,” one senior Japanese 
defense expert said. “But, if politicians are regarded by the general public as hawkish on nuclear 
weapons, they could lose their seat.”[29]  
To what extent could we expect the importance of this factor to fade? Over time, the nuclear 
allergy is likely to become less prominent. In March 2007, a range of defense experts interviewed 
in Tokyo agreed that the younger generation shows less hesitation about Japan exerting military 
power and shows less aversion to nuclear weapons than older cohorts. Because of the 
transmission of experiences from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this will likely take place more slowly 
than might be expected—but will still occur.  
Peace Groups and the Media. The potency of the nuclear allergy is reinforced by a new breed 
of peace groups and their connections with the media. A number of small groups have organized 
to stress the rationality and logic of Japanese nuclear forbearance (in contrast to more traditional 
anti-nuclear groups, which base arguments on emotional appeals). For example, Peace Depot, a 
small NGO based outside of Tokyo, documented official Japanese pledges made during the 2000 
NPT review conference. Then, they published explicit reviews of Japanese government actions, 
measuring actions taken versus actions promised. They use this to lobby the Japanese 
government, and also widely disseminate the materials to the media and peace groups, in hopes 
that other domestic NGOs will use the information as well. Within five years, moderate and 
progressive newspapers have done over a hundred articles on Peace Depot, illustrating how the 
group’s influence is magnified through media attention.[30] Both the government and 
conservative defense experts have noted the effectiveness of such groups. A Japanese 
ambassador noted that such groups do constrain the government’s ability to assess a full range 
of defense options, including nuclear.[31] A conservative defense expert argued that these 
groups have the power to focus public attention, and thus can sway the opinion of members of 
the general public.[32]  
To what extent could we expect the importance of this factor to fade? In the short term, these 
groups will likely maintain or strengthen their influence as their effectiveness buoys supporters. 
However, as the nuclear allergy slowly fades, some support may be lost. Because the groups 
base their arguments on rationality and logic—for example, a Japanese nuclear weapons 
program will seriously erode regional relationships—they may be somewhat insulated from a 
weakening of the nuclear allergy.  
Nuclear Power Industry. Approximately 30 percent of Japan’s energy comes from nuclear 
power; Japan has almost no indigenous sources of energy. Thus, nuclear power is critical to both 
the Japanese economy and security, and the nuclear power industry is taken seriously by 
Japanese politicians. The nuclear power leadership is quite concerned about any movements 
toward a Japanese nuclear option, and fears that politicians talking about the nuclear option could 
seriously hurt their industry. Japan’s nuclear industry is dependent on international fuel supplies, 
and some have raised the question as to whether the international community would want to 
supply uranium to a nuclear-armed Japan. A senior LDP member, Koichi Kato, criticized LDP 
policy chief Shoichi Nakagawa after he publicly called for open discussion on a Japanese military 
nuclear capability. Kato said,  
Japan has the technology to make nuclear weapons. But if, in the future, serious discussion takes 
place on acquiring nuclear weapons, it will affect our nuclear power industry, upon which we rely 
for much of our energy. Japan has to import uranium for its nuclear power plants, and discussions 
about acquiring nuclear weapons will impact international debate on whether it's wise to supply 
Japan with uranium.[33] 
Defense experts agree that the nuclear power industry is a force for nonproliferation in Japan. 
One senior expert argued, “The most sensitive sector involves those people involved in peaceful 
use of nuclear capability—the Atomic Energy Commission. They are afraid their program will be 
seriously jeopardized by any politicians talking about nuclear capability. This is the most 
important resistance you can imagine.”[34] Other experts noted that while younger nuclear 
physicists may be interested in military applications because of prestige, industry leadership—
dominated by an older generation still influenced by the nuclear allergy—is firmly against it.  
To what extent could we expect the importance of this factor to fade? First, as time passes, the 
younger generation will take positions of leadership in the nuclear industry, without so much 
aversion to nuclear weapons. However, more importantly, if/when Japan is able to develop an 
independent supply of nuclear fuel, the concern over international supply will be greatly mitigated.  
LDP Alliance with New Komeito. A significant political obstacle to a Japanese nuclear weapons 
program, at least in the short term, is the LDP alliance with New Komeito, an offshoot of the 
Buddhist organization Soka Gakkai. New Komeito (literally, “clean government”) prefers pacifist 
policies and would not support a Japanese nuclear option. Should the LDP pursue military 
nuclear capabilities, New Komeito would likely withdraw from the governing coalition, leaving the 
LDP in a precarious position. Although currently, the LDP has a majority in the Lower House 
without New Komeito, they could not sustain the majority without New Komeito support. This is 
because New Komeito encourages its supporters to vote for LDP candidates in elections; without 
this support, the LDP would not retain its control of the Diet.[35] As noted by Jun Iio, professor of 
government at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo, “The LDP cannot 
remain the ruling party without the New Komeito.”[36] One analysis showed that 80 percent of 
LDP candidates endorsed by New Komeito won seats in the Diet, as opposed to 55 percent of 
those who were not endorsed by the junior partner.[37]  
To what extent could we expect the importance of this factor to fade? Unless the LDP gains 
strength—unlikely in the short term—they will continue to be dependent on their pacifist junior 
partner, which seriously hinders their ability to pursue a nuclear option. Indeed, the recent 
trajectory of Japanese politics has been toward a more genuine multiparty system, which will 
likely continue in the near to mid-term.  
The Rise of Nationalism. Growing Japanese nationalism is evident in both political and public 
circles. The controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine—and especially former Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to it while in office—has highlighted the issue of Japanese nationalism 
internationally. So has the debate over Japanese war crimes, which has simmered for years due 
to textbooks revisions and which boiled over this spring after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe denied 
the Japanese government forced Chinese and Korean women into sexual slavery. Indeed, Abe is 
widely seen as hawkish, on issues from constitutional revision (he believes it is inappropriate for 
Japan to operate under a constitution written by the United States) to military power (a number of 
experts believed that Abe privately favored the nuclear option). The issue of nuclear myth 
makers—defined by Peter Lavoy as elites who champion the benefits of nuclear weapons 
development—comes into play here.[38] As right-wing politicians come into power, they bring 
with them intellectuals who are able to promote nuclear weapons as part of the natural 
development of a powerful state. One potential nuclear mythmaker to watch is Ambassador 
Hisahiko Okazaki, an influential member of Abe’s inner circle and a public advocate of 
considering nuclear weapons.  
In the public sphere, rising nationalism can also be seen. Manga is a popular outlet for this 
growing sentiment, seen in publications such Hating the Korean Wave. These manga argue 
Japan superiority and claim that the “Korean government invited the Japanese to colonize their 
country, so that Koreans might become enlightened by their more Westernized and modern 
Japanese neighbors.”[39] A popular anti-Chinese manga, An Introduction to China, argues that 
China offers nothing of value and Japanese war-time atrocities against China are little more than 
fabrications.[40] The United States has not escaped the criticism, as one defense expert noted: 
“One manga artist, Yoshinori Kobayashi, has had some influence on younger generation’s 
opinion. He advocates that we revise the constitution and kill the alliance with the United 
States.”[41]  
To what extent can we expect this factor to increase in strength over time? Nationalism will likely 
continue to grow in the foreseeable future. Of course, rising nationalism gives greater room for 
right-wing politicians to advance an agenda of independent military capability, which may include 
nuclear weapons. Currently, other factors weigh heavily against a nuclear option, but as those 
weaken, rising nationalism could increase that possibility, especially if Japan’s relations with its 
neighbors continue to be less than optimal. 
International Determinants  
Because most domestic factors work to keep Japan non-nuclear, it is likely that any change in 
Japanese nuclear policy will be due to international forces. A number of external factors have the 
potential of dramatically changing the security dialogue within Japan.  
U.S. Withdrawal. Should the United States withdraw from the U.S-Japan Security Treaty or 
otherwise retract the nuclear umbrella, Japan will take the nuclear option much more seriously. 
One Japanese defense expert noted that the most important thing the United States can do to 
keep Japan from going nuclear is to maintain and strengthen the U.S.-Japan security 
relationship.[42] A U.S. withdrawal does not, however, guarantee that Japan would take the 
nuclear option. A number of Japanese defense analysts noted that a very strong conventional 
defense could take the place of a military nuclear capability. Others mentioned that because 
developing a second-strike capability would take years to develop, a nuclear force was less 
attractive—especially considering how vulnerable the small island country is to any nuclear strike. 
Thus, the Japanese response to U.S. disengagement would not necessarily be a nuclear one, but 
the potential for a nuclear Japan certainly increases.  
U.S. “Abandonment” of Japan for China. Japan’s long-term concern is not North Korea; it is 
China. With China’s aggressive, nontransparent military build-up, the Japanese are concerned 
about their ability to balance the potential superpower. With the United States on its side, the 
concern is greatly lessened. However, if Washington makes a strategic decision to align with 
China, the Japanese concern will spike. In such a scenario, the nuclear umbrella could technically 
remain in place, but its credibility would be greatly diminished. One expert noted that additional 
“Japan passing” could cause a gradual rethinking in Tokyo about the best ways to maintain its 
security.[43] Another expert was more blunt: “Don’t abandon us for China.”[44] A nuclear 
response would not be immediate, nor likely (as in the case of a formal U.S. withdrawal), but its 
likelihood does increase. This is due in part to the fact that a strengthened U.S.-China 
relationship could cause resurgence in Japanese militarism and could tip the balance 
domestically for a stronger military, including a potential nuclear option.  
Breakdown of the NPT. Part of what strengthens both the nuclear allergy and anti-nuclear peace 
groups is the international norm against nuclear proliferation. The NPT allows domestic groups to 
obtain legitimacy outside of their own claims by linking to an international prohibition against the 
spread of nuclear weapons. In fact, the peace group Peace Depot documents Japanese 
government pledges in NPT review conferences and then grades the government on their 
progress toward fulfilling those pledges. Without the NPT, such actions would not be possible. So 
a weakening of the NPT could result in weakening of the domestic norm against nuclear 
proliferation. Another side effect of an NPT collapse would be the breakdown in IAEA agreements 
and inspections. This web of agreements is often brought up by Japanese experts as a reason 
why Japan cannot go nuclear: because it would violate IAEA agreements. Finally, should the NPT 
fail, some Japanese fear that nuclear weapons would become conventionalized, and thus 
weaken domestic sentiment against a military nuclear capability. This would also raise security 
concerns if nuclear weapons spread in the region, either to Taiwan or to a united Korea. Again, 
collapse of the NPT does not guarantee that Japan would take the nuclear option, but it does 
increase the odds.  
U.S. Approval. Most of the pro-nuclear advocates in Japan (and there are not many of them, 
especially not publicly) predicate their advocacy on U.S. permission. As one defense expert noted, 
pro-nuclear advocate Okazaki has argued that “Japan does not have to take the option as long as 
the U.S. commitment is there, but if Japan is really pressed by a hostile power, Japan would 
taken an option of limited nuclear weapons to strengthen the U.S. nuclear umbrella system—just 
like the UK. So if Japan became really serious, they would try to persuade US leadership. It 
would happen within the U.S.-Japan security framework.”[45] A number of high-level officials 
mentioned that Japan could not go nuclear without U.S. approval.[46] Japan’s security is 
dependent on their relationship with the United States; a nuclear armament cannot substitute for 
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, in the minds of Japanese elites. Thus, a military nuclear 
capability could only happen in the context of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Of course, just 
because Washington gives Tokyo approval for a nuclear weapons program does not mean Tokyo 
will take that option. But it would mitigate concerns for right-wing proponents and potentially make 
them more likely to advocate openly for a Japanese nuclear weapons program.  
North Korean Nuclear Attack. As previously mentioned, North Korea is of short-term concern to 
Japan, but is not seen as a long-term security threat. As Izumi and Furukawa note in their Arms 
Control Today analysis, Japan’s response to the North Korean nuclear tests is firmly “Not Going 
Nuclear.”[47] Additional North Korean nuclear tests would likely strain Japanese patience but 
would be unlikely to provoke a nuclear response. However, a North Korean nuclear attack—
though seen as extremely unlikely—would potentially traumatize the nation enough to shock the 
public into accepting a Japanese nuclear deterrent. Indeed, such an event could potentially 
reframe Japanese thinking on nuclear weapons: instead of Japan being a victim of nuclear 
weapons, Japan would be a victim because of its lack of a nuclear deterrent. Numerous 
experts—from a Diet member to an JSDF official to MOD officials—all agreed that a North 
Korean nuclear attack would not guarantee a Japanese nuclear response, but would make it 
highly likely.  
Conclusions  
Accurately predicting whether Japan will remain non-nuclear in the next decades requires a 
crystal ball. Nonetheless, examining the factors that push Tokyo away from and toward a nuclear 
option help us to understand both why the country may reverse its policy of nuclear forbearance 
and the likelihood of such a situation occurring. Currently, most domestic factors pressure Japan 
into maintaining its non-nuclear stance. However, severe exogenous shocks—from U.S. 
withdrawal to a North Korean nuclear attack—can override the influence of these domestic 
determinants, both by weakening them directly and by creating new security concerns that a 
nuclear option could potentially address. The fact that the most critical external factor in the 
Japanese nuclear equation—U.S. extended deterrence—lies within the control of U.S. 
policymakers should reassure Washington, as well as challenge it to address the other potential 
scenarios that could undermine Japanese nuclear forbearance.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
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used for no other purpose. 
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